Sworn testimony and court records describe false credentials, repainted machinery, pressured technicians and diverted public money.
Ecuador’s Progen scandal began with a genuine national emergency. During the electricity crisis of 2024, blackouts stretched as long as 14 hours a day and the government urgently needed additional generating capacity.
What followed, according to criminal investigators in Ecuador and a federal lawsuit in Florida, was not simply a delayed or poorly managed public contract. It was an operation in which technical warnings were allegedly disregarded, documents were falsified, used generators were presented as new and millions of dollars left a company bank account without any clear connection to the projects.
The two contracts awarded to the Florida-based Progen Industries were supposed to provide 150 megawatts of thermal generation at Quevedo and El Salitral. Together, they were worth $149.1 million: $99.4 million for El Salitral and $49.7 million for Quevedo.
Celec, Ecuador’s state-owned electricity corporation, paid Progen $104.37 million as a 70% advance. Prosecutors now consider that amount the presumed loss to the state because the plants never entered operation. In the related U.S. civil case, Celec describes the amount paid as “nearly $110 million,” a rounded figure covering the money it is attempting to trace through Progen’s accounts.
Warnings appeared before the contracts were signed
The warning signs were not discovered only after the equipment reached Ecuador. Members of a four-person Celec technical committee said they found serious deficiencies while reviewing Progen’s preliminary proposal.
The company had not presented a letter from the engine manufacturer or an authorized distributor. Its documents contained inconsistent figures for fuel efficiency, making it impossible to determine whether the equipment met Celec’s minimum requirements. Progen also failed to provide a manufacturer’s certificate showing that the engines were new, built since 2020 and had zero operating hours.
Those doubts intensified after Resource Power Group, the authorized EMD engine distributor in Ecuador, warned officials that the EMD 20-645 model initially offered by Progen had stopped being manufactured for electrical generation in 2015. The distributor said it could not guarantee the condition of the engines or the availability of replacement parts.
Romel Llumiquinga, a former member of the committee and one of the defendants in Ecuador’s criminal case, testified that the technicians were summoned to a meeting at Celec headquarters on June 28, 2024. They were allegedly required to leave their cellphones outside and were pressured to remove their observations from the report.
The committee refused and requested that any such order be issued in writing. Llumiquinga said the acting manager of Celec’s Termopichincha unit later warned the technicians that instructions had come from then-Celec general manager Fabián Calero to dismiss them unless they issued a recommendation allowing the process to continue.
Despite the unresolved questions, the contracts were signed on August 2, 2024.
Experience allegedly manufactured on paper
- Wade Manning, a Progen vice president and the brother of company chief executive John Manning, has now provided sworn testimony in the Florida lawsuit.
Manning said Progen submitted four false experience certificates to create the appearance that it had successfully handled projects comparable to Quevedo and El Salitral. He also described a false certificate stating that the generators had zero hours of use and another claiming Progen was the exclusive manufacturer of their engines.
In reality, Manning said, the company had never carried out a project of similar size. Its previous experience consisted principally of supplying three generators in Texas that led to litigation and four units in Africa that produced customer complaints. Manning also acknowledged that he had no formal education or technical training in mechanics or energy, despite holding a senior engineering-related position.
Manning’s testimony did not come from a neutral outsider. He is a defendant in the Florida case and had fallen out with his brother after Progen stopped paying his $13,000 monthly salary. He resigned in March 2026 and said the company still owed him $65,000.
But significant portions of his account are supported by documents from Apollo Electric, the Houston company that sold equipment to Progen.
Used generators were given a new identity
Apollo Electric’s president stated under penalty of perjury that Progen purchased 21 used EMD 20-710 generator sets on an “as-is, where-is” basis. Progen paid $425,000 per unit, or $8.925 million for the group.
The serial numbers showed when the engines had originally been manufactured. The equipment was not sold as new, rebuilt to a new-equipment standard or guaranteed to be suitable for the Ecuadorian contracts. Apollo’s declaration says the units were intended for Ecuador and were painted by an industrial contractor at the request of John and Wade Manning.
According to Wade Manning’s deposition, original manufacturer plates were removed and replaced with Progen labels. The generators were cleaned and painted, and identifying information was changed to create the appearance that Progen had manufactured them.
The Florida filing says Progen also acquired used equipment from an Indian supplier, removed components, scraped away original labels and installed replacement plates before shipping the machinery to Celec as new. Manning testified that the generators were never properly performance-tested and were unsuitable for the heavy fuel oil required under the contracts.
The discrepancy between the engine models in the records is significant but explainable. Progen’s preliminary offer referred to EMD 20-645 engines, while Apollo’s later sales records identify 21 used EMD 20-710 units. That indicates the equipment changed between the preliminary market study and the eventual purchases.
Llumiquinga said any alteration of brands, models, certificates or technical characteristics should have been reviewed by the officials involved in the later contracting stages. The unanswered question is how a proposal already carrying major technical warnings evolved into purchases of different used equipment without stopping the process.
Conflicting accounts of the committees’ role
Ecuadorian prosecutors say technical commissions recommended awarding the contracts even though Progen failed to satisfy technical, economic and legal requirements.
Llumiquinga disputes that description. He says his committee merely recommended inviting Progen to submit a formal offer, subject to full compliance with the specifications, and did not recommend awarding either contract or making Progen the exclusive bidder.
The statements may refer to different stages or different review bodies, but the distinction has not been resolved publicly. Determining which officials evaluated the final offer, approved changes in the equipment and authorized the payments will be central to assigning responsibility.
The money moved while the generators remained silent
Celec’s lawyers say bank records show that the account receiving Ecuador’s payments was systematically emptied through dozens of checks and wire transfers to people and entities in several countries. The account eventually reached a zero balance.
Wade Manning testified that most recipients of Celec’s money had performed no work connected to Quevedo or El Salitral. The federal filing also says several relatives of John Manning and Progen executive Andrew Williamson received salaries or other benefits from companies associated with the operation.
Manning described expensive real estate purchases made after Progen received Ecuador’s money. Andrew Williamson reportedly purchased a Florida residence for $2.85 million in cash, while John Manning and his wife were building another costly home. Celec alleges that public funds were also used for personal expenses and payments unrelated to the power plants.
The deposition created another evidentiary problem for investigators: Wade Manning admitted intentionally deleting private and group text messages exchanged with his brother, Williamson and other senior Progen executives.
Manning said he had no direct knowledge that bribes were paid to Ecuadorian officials. For now, the most concrete evidence concerns false documentation, the origin and alteration of the machinery, pressure inside Celec and the movement of the money. Investigators must still establish who within Ecuador approved each step and whether those decisions involved personal payments or other benefits.
Criminal charges and a U.S. racketeering lawsuit
Ecuador’s Prosecutor’s Office has charged 21 people with alleged embezzlement, including former Energy Minister Antonio Goncalves, former Celec manager Fabián Calero, other public officials and two representatives of companies involved in supplying the equipment. Prosecutors allege that normal contracting requirements were evaded to favor Progen even though its proposal did not meet the specifications.
In Florida, Celec is pursuing claims involving federal and state racketeering laws, fraud, conspiracy, deceptive business practices, conversion and fraudulent transfers. Progen has rejected the fraud allegations and argues that Ecuador is attempting to turn a contractual disagreement into a politically motivated case.
The Florida case remains in discovery, with Celec seeking bank and business records from recipients of Progen transfers. Discovery is scheduled to close in February 2027, followed by a jury trial term beginning August 2, 2027. Until then, subpoenas and testimony will continue tracing how an emergency program intended to end Ecuador’s blackouts produced two silent power plants, a depleted bank account and one of the country’s largest public corruption investigations.


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