Temporary deployment deepens security cooperation after referendum defeat, testing limits of Ecuador’s agreements with Washington

A contingent of U.S. Air Force personnel and military equipment has arrived at the Ecuadorian Air Force base in Manta, reopening a sensitive chapter in bilateral security cooperation just weeks after voters rejected the return of foreign military bases. The deployment, described by both governments as temporary, rests on a set of agreements negotiated under former president Guillermo Lasso and now fully activated by the administration of Daniel Noboa.

The arrival marks the first operational use of a legal framework that allows U.S. military and civilian personnel to operate by air, sea, and land inside Ecuador, with broad guarantees of immunity. While officials frame the mission as narrowly focused on counter-narcotics cooperation, critics argue it blurs the line voters sought to draw when they rejected the installation of foreign bases in a national referendum.

A deployment built on three agreements

At the center of the operation is a trilogy of military cooperation agreements that together cover nearly every dimension of joint security activity. The first, a Status of Forces Agreement, establishes the conditions under which U.S. personnel may enter Ecuador, carry weapons while on duty, wear uniforms, and operate with privileges equivalent to diplomatic immunity. It also places criminal jurisdiction and disciplinary authority firmly in U.S. hands.

A second accord governs operations against illicit transnational maritime activities, from drug and arms trafficking to migrant smuggling and illegal fishing. Under this framework, Ecuador authorizes combined maritime patrols and allows designated officers from each country to operate aboard the other’s vessels, though Washington may not act inside Ecuadorian territorial waters without Quito’s consent. The Ministry of Defense can also clear U.S. law-enforcement aircraft to operate in national airspace.

The third agreement focuses on air interception assistance. It commits Ecuador to strict limits on the use of force against civilian aircraft suspected of drug trafficking, barring the disabling or destruction of planes except in cases of self-defense. Interceptions rely on warning shots using tracer ammunition and must avoid risk to people or property on the ground. Unlike the other two agreements, this pact does not require U.S. operational personnel in Ecuador, but it does open the door to funding, radar data, intelligence, equipment, training, and command-and-control support.

Together, the accords provide the legal cover now underpinning the Manta operation, which was announced by the U.S. Embassy in Quito on December 17 as part of a “long-term bilateral security strategy.”

Manta, again

Manta’s selection is politically charged. The coastal base hosted a U.S. forward operating location for a decade, until its closure in 2009 under then-president Rafael Correa. That history resurfaced during the recent referendum, when more than 60% of voters rejected a proposal to allow foreign military bases to return.

Despite the vote, U.S. military aircraft were already touching down. Flight-tracking data show an Air Mobility Command plane arriving from Charleston, South Carolina, two days before the public announcement, carrying equipment later confirmed by Ecuador’s Ministry of Defense. Officials insist the deployment complies fully with existing agreements and Ecuadorian law.

Noboa has defended the operation as a practical response to a spiraling security crisis. “This operation will allow us to identify and dismantle drug-trafficking routes,” he said in a brief statement, emphasizing that U.S. personnel will work alongside the Ecuadorian Air Force.

Security crisis and political pressure

The timing is hard to separate from Ecuador’s deteriorating security situation. With violence surging and criminal networks expanding, 2025 is on track to become the bloodiest year in the country’s history. Noboa’s government, under intense public pressure, has leaned heavily on international cooperation to bolster intelligence and operational capacity.

The Manta deployment also follows high-level U.S. engagement. In early November, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem toured air force bases in Manta and Salinas with Noboa, fueling speculation about renewed, more permanent U.S. access to Ecuadorian facilities, including Baltra Island and sites in Santa Elena province. Those plans stalled after the referendum defeat, forcing the government to rely on the agreements already in force.

A wider regional strategy

Ecuador’s case fits into a broader regional push by Washington. The United States has intensified military operations against alleged drug-trafficking networks along the Venezuelan coast, targeting dozens of boats in actions that have reportedly left scores dead. At the same time, the administration of Donald Trump has signed or revived similar security arrangements with countries such as Peru and Paraguay, presenting them as tools against transnational crime.

These overtures come as political winds shift across South America and as Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro finds himself increasingly isolated, even among former allies. For Washington, the objective is explicit: stable partners that curb migration, cooperate on drug interdiction, and guarantee continued access to strategically important locations.

An uneven relationship

Yet the renewed military cooperation with Quito carries its own contradictions. The White House has not appointed an ambassador to Ecuador, and Noboa has so far failed to secure a meeting with his U.S. counterpart. While U.S. aircraft and personnel operate on Ecuadorian soil, diplomatic engagement at the highest level remains conspicuously thin.

For now, the operation in Manta underscores a reality voters sought to resist but legal agreements have enabled: even without a foreign base, the United States can project military presence into Ecuador through temporary deployments, joint missions, and expansive immunities. Whether that balance satisfies public expectations—or deepens political unease—will likely depend on how visible, how long-lasting, and how effective the operation proves to be.