President presses ahead with amendments as political tensions deepen after referendum loss.

A president searching for momentum after defeat

President Daniel Noboa reemerged publicly nearly two weeks after his referendum loss, conceding that the results hit his administration harder than expected. Speaking alongside former Quito mayor Jorge Yunda in a carefully staged conversation at Carondelet Palace, Noboa acknowledged frustration within his party and Cabinet, saying many expected him to “score the goal” in the final minutes without doing their part earlier. Yet instead of addressing the country’s worsening security and economic crises, he focused on one objective: reviving his constitutional reform agenda.

Noboa insisted that voters had rejected ideas such as reducing bureaucracy, cutting funding for political movements, seeking international support to fight crime, and ending priority-status protections for prisoners. But those claims do not match the actual ballot content. The questions focused on reducing the number of assembly members, enabling foreign military presence, tightening security policies, and authorizing international arbitration for investment disputes.

Voters rejected each proposal by margins of 54% to 62%, signaling dissatisfaction not only with the content but with the administration’s broader direction.

A strategic misreading of the vote

The attempt to frame the defeat as a misunderstanding of noble intentions has done little to quiet internal criticism. Even Noboa acknowledged that voters sent a wider message about governance—one that extended far beyond the four rejected questions. Several of his talking points referenced issues never presented on the ballot, suggesting an effort to repackage the loss as a communication failure rather than a political one.

Still, senior figures in his movement, National Democratic Action (ADN), say they will not abandon the agenda. Noboa repeated that “we will continue working tirelessly” to push through structural changes he considers essential. That includes returning to the same mechanisms that just failed: constitutional amendments and partial reforms, both of which ultimately require voter approval.

Facing a Constitutional Court he tried to weaken

Before any proposal reaches the ballot, it must be reviewed by the Constitutional Court. Over the past year, Noboa has publicly attacked the Court, accusing it of blocking reforms needed to confront Ecuador’s spiraling security crisis. His government even attempted to limit the judges’ authority, but the effort was dismissed. Now, the President must return to the same institution he tried to pressure.

“Hopefully the Court will no longer become an enemy of the people,” he said—framing judicial oversight as political obstruction. But the Court has already established boundaries he cannot bypass. It has rejected attempts to remove prisoners from priority-care categories, citing international human rights treaties and the principle of non-regression. The judges have also ruled that chemical castration for rapists is unconstitutional, violating physical integrity protections and lacking evidence of effectiveness. These rulings, the Court has stated, cannot be overridden—not by the Assembly, not by a referendum, and not even by a constituent assembly.

The legal pathways still available—and their limits

Despite the constraints, Noboa retains three possible strategies: partial reform, constitutional amendment, and legislative initiative.

Partial reform applies only to proposals that do not restrict rights or restructure the State. Under this route, the Assembly must hold two debates spaced at least 90 days apart, after which citizens must ratify the reform in a national vote within 45 days. It is a long, politically heavy process, and the referendum requirement poses the same risk the government just experienced.

Constitutional amendments can bypass the Assembly entirely, but only if they do not alter the fundamental character of the State or restrict constitutional rights. In these cases, the proposal goes directly to a public vote—again requiring the political capital the government clearly lacks.

The third route, legislative initiative, offers one advantage: if successful, it avoids a referendum altogether. This was the mechanism used in 2015, when Rafael Correa and the Alianza PAIS bloc approved 15 constitutional changes through sheer legislative force. For Noboa’s bloc, the challenge is formidable. ADN would need at least 50 signatures to initiate the process and 100 votes to approve reforms one year later. That means convincing not only allied forces but the powerful Citizen Revolution movement—an alliance that currently looks improbable.

A political gamble with uncertain backing

The push for constitutional change is unfolding as the administration faces declining approval ratings, fractious legislative relations, and a hostile security environment. While Noboa frames the reforms as a response to national urgency, critics argue that ignoring the referendum results risks deepening polarization and weakening democratic legitimacy.

Even so, the President appears determined to advance his agenda, signaling that the public’s rejection has not softened his ambitions. For now, the battle moves back to the Constitutional Court and the National Assembly, where Noboa hopes to find a path voters have already closed. How he navigates that terrain may determine whether his reform drive regains momentum—or becomes another stalled promise in a turbulent political year.