A transcript of his meeting with our [The Economist] journalists.

Daniel Noboa, Ecuador’s president, spoke to The Economist on June 6th in Guayaquil, Ecuador. The conversation has been automatically transcribed and lightly edited for clarity. We have not checked any figures cited by Mr. Noboa.

Read our article on Mr. Noboa, and our leader on Ecuador.

The Economist: Can I just start with a question that you just earned a full term, a second term, with a big margin, and I think beat pretty much all expectations for the margin of victory. What do you attribute that to? Why did you win by such a big margin?

Daniel Noboa: Well, we did analyze the situation in the last few weeks, and we saw an opportunity. We saw there were a lot of undecided votes, especially in three provinces, including Guayas. So statistically, what all the pollsters were evaluating was based on really 80% of the total votes, so there was a statistical error there. But in Guayaquil, for example, and in the province of Guayas, there was approximately 20% undecided vote until the last week, and we were able to gain most of that vote. That was a big difference, over 300,000 votes just in those undecided.

The Economist: And why do you think they swung for you?

Daniel Noboa: Well, people in Guayaquil usually decide later than the rest of the country, but there was this discussion whether we were doing the right thing or not. And it’s more about sentiment, it’s more about feelings. So, people thought we were doing the right thing, especially on security and on the economy. So, they said, you know what, we need to give the president four more years to finish his work. The first 18 months were a bit of a rollercoaster. We had severe droughts. We had also earthquakes, oil spills, and terrorism also in our oil infrastructure, and people know that this was part of the war. This whole fight was part of the war. And they believe that the person that could continue doing it without fear and continue fighting criminality and fighting these narco-terrorist groups was President Noboa.

The Economist: And Mr. President, to get a bit of your vision for this coming term, if you could mention two or three of the initiatives that you think will be really key for this presidential term for you?

Daniel Noboa: I’m gonna try to oversimplify it a little bit, but it’s allocating resources as quickly as possible directly to the benefit of the people. So that is the general idea. How? We need to accelerate foreign direct investment, we need to accelerate investment in energy, and in mining, legal mining, legal responsible mining. And also, we need to make the adequate reforms on the judicial side, and also in public contracting to make this happen. For example, in the middle of a war, to purchase, if you were part of the military or the police, for them, for those institutions to purchase something that they need, tools that they need to fight criminality, to fight narco-terrorism, it took 18 months to 24 months. So one of the things that we’re doing to accelerate that process is a law that we hope to pass in the next couple of weeks, which is the law of national solidarity. So what does that mean? It’s not only the judicial reforms that are needed, but also the fact that we are allowing companies – also just people in general – to use up to 30% of their income tax, of what they’re supposed to pay, directly in donations to the police and military. So what does that mean? If a large beer company, if a large construction company, or a very successful doctor has to pay 3 million dollars in income tax, 1 million dollars can go directly in items to fight the war on terrorism. So that 30% doesn’t have to go through the whole process of two years of contracting and legal blockades and stuff like that. So, large companies can show solidarity. Anyone can show [solidarity]. So, 30% of it can go directly to the police or to the military, and we have a list of items that are going to be publicly known of the things that we need. We need radars, we need scanners, drones for border protection. We also need drones to control illegal fishing in national waters. How does the mechanism work? So, let’s say a company purchases 10 million dollars in pickup trucks for the police. The IRS [tax authorities] gives them a tax credit, and they have to pay it in May 2026. They use that tax credit.

The Economist: I think that really brings us to a big topic that we wanna discuss with you around security and justice in Ecuador. Obviously, when you came to power, there were already some grave security problems in Ecuador, and you called for an internal armed conflict and sent the military into prisons and onto the streets. And initially we saw homicides fall, but then they rose again, and in the beginning of this year, they hit record highs. So we wanted to know: why did they not continue declining? And is that a limitation of this approach to fighting crime?

Daniel Noboa: Okay, two things. First, there are usually spikes in criminality prior to an election. I leave that open for interpretation to whoever is going to read or see this. So that’s one thing. The other thing is that the groups adapt, wars are not linear. Groups adapt, change mechanisms—then armed forces change mechanisms. So it is a constant battle. We did have a spike in May and in March. Same thing happened in October, right before I got elected, about 19 months ago. About 836 homicides in that month. So it’s usually the attempt to destabilize a new government. To confuse people and to make them think that they made the wrong decision. And the numbers say it. This month, we are adapting as well. So we’re already seeing a decline, this first week, we’re changing a few things, and the number of homicides per day is coming down. It’s a constant struggle. This year, this first week, we’re around 20 per day. That’s still more or less a 35 to 40% drop compared to the previous month. So it’s cyclical. It also has to do with two things, which are external factors, which are part of the war. The price of gold and coca crops, coca cycles. So, you see the graph or the statistics whenever gold spikes, you see an increase in criminality, because there’s an increase in illegal mining. Whenever there’s a coca crop coming into production, there’s also an increase right after in the distribution. We need to control those cycles and flatten that curve in order to have better results. Those are two external factors that actually hit in terms of criminality and terrorism, because they’re not regular gangs anymore. These are groups that are very well organized, that have Ivy League graduates working for them internationally. They are not just common gangs, They’re transnational crime syndicates. Estimates say that the total production and export of cocaine, aside from illegal mining, is close to 30 billion dollars in cash a year. It’s about 26% of the national GDP. So, it’s not only the amount, it’s the percentage compared to the GDP. So that’s also something that we need to consider. We need to consider that illegal mining is becoming more and more profitable, and these groups are moving from just drug trafficking to illegal mining.

The Economist: You have rightly pointed out that the Ecuadorian crime problem is a transnational one. And you have also mentioned that you want to bring in troops, possibly from the United States, European troops, Brazilian troops to help Ecuador fight the criminal gangs. We wanted to know; have you made any progress in terms of securing commitments from foreign governments in deploying soldiers and police in Ecuador?

Daniel Noboa: I think the world is becoming more sincere in what they want and what they’re looking for. So things work when there’s reciprocity, and when there are common goals. And there’s reciprocity. So we do have advances in talks with the United Arab Emirates and with Israel, but also, we have a close relationship and we’re advancing with Belgium and the Netherlands. Why? Because the two largest ports in Europe and the ones that receive the largest amount of cocaine, not only from Ecuador, but from all origins. So we need to have these strategic alliances. It’s not just about bringing people here or bringing troops here, it’s also about bringing intelligence, about having information being transmitted from one country to the other, to have interconnected systems, and to follow the money. If we follow the money, then we solve most of the problem. The issue is when we have these forms of reintroducing cash into the system to help these crime organizations, these narco-terrorist groups. The fact that we’re dollarized makes it easier for them. There’s no currency exchange. And remember, in Lava Jato [a major corruption scandal in Latin America], what happened in Odebrecht, what started and how they got caught, was due to currency exchange.

The Economist: Earlier this year, you also invited Eric Prince, the founder of Blackwater, to Ecuador. Can you tell us a little bit more about what Eric Prince and his mercenaries are set out to do here in Ecuador?

Daniel Noboa: I mean, he’s an international security company. I don’t think that he does everything right, but I think he does a few things better than most. And he came here to advise. There was no participation of personnel here. He came here as an adviser, he helped us organize a few things, and he has a lot of experience. He has experience in areas of high conflict, for example in Haiti or in the Middle East, or in some areas that have small spots like that, but that are quite similar in operation. And they’re isolated in a way, because in the same country, which is a very diverse country, Quito which is the second safest capital in terms of crime in South America after Montevideo. And also Cuenca that just got voted in three different rankings as the highest quality of life in Latin America. So that’s also something that I would like the world to see, because if we only talk about the most negative things, people won’t come here. We can only change the lives of many poor people in this country if we can attract investment, if we can attract tourism, if we can help communities. The economy is stabilizing. We just had the two best months in general sales in the history of the country. First two months, as ordinary months, not June or December, because in December, as half a year reports are being done, but just as a regular month, April and May were the only two months in the history of the country—with a low price of oil—that the sales were above 20 billion dollars. So 20.1, 20.03, that’s April and May. So the economy is moving. Employment is improving. Country risk is coming down. Inflation is controlled at 0.3%. What we need is to control the violent areas, control our borders, and also promote investment. Now the world is starting to see the country and that’s a good thing.

The Economist: We would love to talk definitely in a moment a bit more about the economy. Can I just ask on a slightly more personal note, you came into office first time around just after another presidential candidate was assassinated. You’ve obviously received death threats that we’ve read about. What is it like to live under threat in that way all the time? Does the job feel worth it despite all of that?

Daniel Noboa: Well, I’m not gonna lie, there are moments that you start questioning it, but most of the time it feels right. It feels right to help people. It feels right to leave a legacy, not only for my children, but also for the next generations. And I think that’s more powerful than fear. It hasn’t been easy. We’ve had death threats on a daily basis for the last two years. But if I’m afraid, what can I expect for the 18 million people that I have to protect, that I have to be in front of? So I cannot afford to have fear. People expect me to be stronger than that.

The Economist: I’d love to talk just a little bit about justice, relating to security, but clearly there’s challenges in any state that has serious crime problems with processing everyone. I wanted to ask you a fairly direct question, but how comfortable are you with making mass arrests of suspected criminals, even if it won’t be possible, potentially for quite a long time, for them to face a trial in court? How comfortable are you with having to do that?

Daniel Noboa: I mean, as comfortable as one can be in democracy. It’s separation of powers. So it’s the judicial branch, the legislative, and the executive. We do our job in the executive. We hope that the judicial branch can do their job as well. It’s frustrating, not only for me sometimes, but also for the military, for the police, and for the families of the victims. It’s very frustrating to see suddenly someone that is known, that is a sicario [hitman] or that has committed dozens of crimes, suddenly gets house arrest. And they just found him with ten rifles in his car—and not only house arrest, but a police officer has to be protecting him outside of his home in a dangerous neighborhood. That generates a reaction in people, aside from how I feel, or the military or police feel. The most important thing is that it generates a reaction in people and people are feeling frustrated. That’s also one of the things that we’re looking to reform in our national solidarity law, this is one of the things that we’re trying to change. There’s not only a clear suspicion, but a probable cause for someone that is part of these narco-terrorist groups, and again, it’s not just a normal gang, it’s not the times of the Bloods and Crips. These groups have evolved. 40,000 armed men and women, and they move dozens of billions of dollars a year. Now, whenever there’s a probable cause and there’s real suspicion, there’s no substitute measures, meaning that you can’t have house arrest until trial, or just periodic presentation in court. We’ve seen many cases also where police officers have been assassinated protecting criminals in house arrest. We have close to 800 police officers right now that are protecting criminals, because a judge just sent them for house arrest. And this includes assassins, large scale drug dealers, rapists. So things need to change—and to do it in a democratic way. It has to go through Congress, Congress needs to accept it, and then that’s the adequate representation of the people.

The Economist: That’s fascinating. Can I just follow up a little bit on the justice side? I’d love to hear a little bit more about the reforms and to understand a little bit more how far you want to go in terms of the trade-off of, we can hold people for much longer, maybe the justice will be slow, but in the meantime, I’ll lock them up. I mean, how far do you want to go?

Daniel Noboa: We need to accelerate things. It’s not… The purpose is not to lock people up. It’s not to have mass arrests, it’s not to use previous practices that have failed. The purpose is to change a country. This is to actually separate violent criminals from people that have committed less serious offenses. It’s about changing neighborhoods. It’s about giving peace. And you don’t give peace just containing violence. You give peace transforming areas. So it’s not about that. Also, some people have other styles. In my personal style, I try to do it in the most democratic way. I think that’s the way I’ve been brought up, the way I’ve been educated as well, and the way that I want to leave my mark in history. I won’t stay one second more than what the constitution allows me. I will never ignore the importance of a parliament or the judicial branch, and I cannot go against the Constitutional Court. That is what keeps this country civilized, this is what keeps this country, the rule of law.

The Economist: I wanted to understand the human rights perspective as well, because there have been some accusations about human-rights violations committed by the state security forces, there was the case of four children here in Guayaquil last year. Do you believe that there’s a risk with increased militarization that you’ll also see more human rights abuses? And if that’s the case then what do you plan to do about that?

Daniel Noboa: Two things. One thing is the risk, the other thing is the certainty. Yes, in increased conflict, there is an increased risk. It’s not a certainty, it’s an increased risk. Do I believe it’s justifiable? No, not at all. As a government, we are on the side of the people. We’re democratically elected. So if there was any wrongdoing—correct wrongdoing—as the word says it, from the military forces or from the police, we will accuse them and we will not sentence them, because I’m not a judge, but we will promote an adequate sentence to it. Also, we need to analyze that this is not a conventional war. There are also elements in politics, elements in the judicial system that are helping these organizations. And one thing that I believe, it’s a shame and I was completely against it, is that lawyers and activists that are closely related to the opposition party are the ones that are pushing this agenda. You can see one of the lawyers of the families is very closely related with Ricardo Patiño. Ricardo Patiño has a Sandinista past. He used to be chancellor of Ecuador, and now he’s a member of the National Assembly, so there’s a close relationship there. We will never hide any wrongdoing done by the police or the military. I’m a father of three and I would never support anything like that.

The Economist: Let me just ask you one last question on the security side. You’ve probably seen that you’re sometimes compared to Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, but understandably you’ve said that you’re your own man, you’re doing things in a different way in a different country. I would just love to hear from you, what do you see as the principal differences between your approach and what Bukele has been doing in El Salvador? Maybe just a couple that stand out for you.

Daniel Noboa: I mean, I can say that my wife sometimes compares me with Cristiano Ronaldo as well. So there’s a clear difference. Some people say I’m closer to Macron. Some people say I’m closer to Lula. Some people say I’m closer to Abinader in the Dominican Republic. But in the end, I have my own style. I respect Bukele. I have nothing against him. He has helped us and his team has helped us when it comes to security issues, especially in urban areas. But I think he has his own style, his own battles. And I have my own. What has been difficult also is to allocate me or put me in a spot. It’s always easier to attack an extreme. It’s much more difficult to attack something that is closer to the center because what’s closer to the center can actually eat up your voter base. So I think the people that tried to push me all the way to the corner or to an extreme are the ones that prefer me there. In our national plan, we’re looking to promote public health and strengthen public education, so ideologically, it’s a bit different, I would say, from Bukele. Like I said, it goes a bit closer to Lula or Macron, in a mix of those two.

The Economist: Maybe we could just jump to institutions. You’ve mentioned the judiciary. I’m just curious how you assess the strength of Ecuador’s sort of nominally independent institutions. So there’s a number of them, you know, there’s the CPCCS [a citizen council tasked with overseeing numerous other nominally independent state institutions] quite a unique institution, but there’s a number that are kind of playing an independent role as part of the state. How healthy and sort of independent do you see them?

Daniel Noboa: Some institutions have their independence when it comes to execution, but the moment that they were elected, they came from different parts or different powers. For example, the Judiciary Council has a delegate from the Attorney General, has one from the National Court, has a delegate from the legislative branch, has a delegate from the public defense, and has a delegate from the executive. So in a way, there are systems of election that are part of the constitution. We cannot modify that right now. In the CPCCS, I do believe that in principle it was a good thing, but eventually, it gets intertwined with political forces. And they say, okay, you cannot run for a party, but you run with a color. And what color is that? The color of a party. In the end, as a general concept, it was a good thing at the beginning, but I think it got a bit mixed with political power.

The Economist: I’d like to ask you one more question here. There’s a sort of short-run, long-run question. In the short run, the rationale for this very strong police and military approach is super clear given the level of crime. In the medium term, obviously, there’s also a risk of criminal gangs infiltrating some institutions of the state, whether it be some of these institutions or political parties themselves. I guess I wonder if by focusing so much on the kind of military and police approach in the short run, is there a risk you neglect that other danger of a kind of medium to long-term capture of some institutions?

Daniel Noboa: I think we’re past that. I think this is the previous term. We’re already infiltrated in several sectors and there’s proof of it. What we’re trying to do is we’re trying to turn that around to have better internal controls, to have better controls in the judiciary and also in the legislative branch, and better controls in local governments. The thing that also occurs is when you start having a more ordered central government, autonomous local governments start having problems. And that’s also what happened. We’ve had assassinations of mayors in previous years. We’ve also had cases of money laundering in small municipalities because it’s more difficult to identify because they’re autonomous. I think there should be tighter controls not only for the central government, which we’re advancing, we’re improving, but also in local governments. Something that is proof is that Google, when we signed a deal with Ecuador—they do their due diligence, they have their own algorithms and they analyze the level of corruption and improvement in corruption in the previous year—and there was a reduction of close to 60%, that’s why Google signed with Ecuador. It’s the third country in the world to sign a deal with Google. It was El Salvador, Kuwait, and Ecuador because in order to publicly trade a company, they need to have their controls and certainty that things are at least going the right way.

The Economist: You mentioned the Attorney General, Fiscal General, and that’s clearly an important position here in Ecuador. And there’s right now a process for selecting the new fiscal. What are you looking for in this fiscal? Do you have any favorite candidate?

Daniel Noboa: I mean, not right now. We need to… There’s a whole… There is an internal election which also has citizens that are observing the whole process and it’s an independent election. I would like someone strong, someone that has a previous success story, especially in criminal law, and someone that understands how courts function because, like I said, it’s not about who’s my favorite candidate, it’s who’s gonna be the strongest one and the best candidate.

The Economist: Jumping a bit to the foreign relations and starting with regional relations in Mexico. Last year Ecuador and Mexico broke their diplomatic relations. So we wanted to know, is there any form of security or intelligence collaboration going on with Mexico now?

Daniel Noboa: No. On the security side, no. I think we have completely different approaches. Last time I checked, in the last few days, Claudia Sheinbaum said that they were not going to confront narcos. Here we are confronting the narcos. So that’s I think pretty different—kind of difficult to have a joint collaboration there. We don’t have any… I don’t have any personal issues with Mexico. I have great Mexican friends and I wish that we could have a good relationship, but there are things that are non-negotiable. For example, delivering a sentenced criminal and sending him to Mexico because that’s not only, that’s something that I’m against, but it’s also not even in my power. It’s in the power of the judiciary.

The Economist: And do you think it’s problematic given the nature of crime and the role of Mexican gangs here in Ecuador?

Daniel Noboa: Of course it’s problematic, of course. But you have a country that has decided not to confront them and we have a country here that has decided to confront them. It’s polar opposites in approach. I hope that we can have better relations with them and that things could work in the near future, because at the end of the day it’s not good to have this type of discussion, especially for Mexico, which had a 600 million dollar surplus in their trade balance with Ecuador. Actually, one of the best relationships they had in the world, percentage-wise, in terms of trade balance, was with Ecuador. We did have a deficit. Now we don’t. Over 500 million dollar a year trade deficit with Mexico.

The Economist: And thinking about the region and another country in the region that has a different approach to security and maybe also a very different vision for government is Gustavo Petro in Colombia who is promoting his total peace plans. How do those differences affect your cooperation in security and combating crime with Colombia, the neighbor?

Daniel Noboa: I mean, it does affect the border, but we are advancing in cooperation for border control and to have mirrored operations on both sides of the border. This affects the people living close to the border, Colombians and Ecuadorians. So I believe that Petro understands that at the end of the day, he needs to govern for his people. And I need to govern for mine. If we can do something together to assure their safety, I think it’s the best. The rest, he has his own particular ideas, but that’s everyone.

The Economist: Do you get on well with him?

Daniel Noboa: I mean, we talk, we’ve seen each other several times. He visited Ecuador in December last year in Galápagos. He came, we had a bilateral meeting in Santa Cruz. I also went to see him at COP [a biodiversity conference] in Cali. I saw him in the inaugural mass of the Pope. We were sitting there for three hours together, so we had a little chat.

The Economist: The last thing on the regional side, but in some of the regions in the world, there are kind of regional forces, whether by military or police, that can kind of come in and help countries. Do you think something like that, a regional defense force or a regional police force, could be useful in Ecuador or indeed in other countries in the region?

Daniel Noboa: I think there should be a joint task force to preserve natural resources, especially in the Amazon. Most of the illegal mining comes in that region on the Ecuadorian side, Brazilian side, Peruvian side. So there should be a collaboration, because we all have a similar issue, we all have a similar problem. With the price of gold over 3,300, we see more and more criminal activities in illegal mining and that affects the environment, affects countries economically and affects the peace of our nation so definitely we should have a joint collaboration. It’s similar soil with similar natural resources and similar problems.

The Economist: And now moving a bit north to the United States, we now have President Donald Trump. He has made it clear that he prioritizes America First and he also has this more transactional approach to international affairs. So, like very specifically, what does a Trump administration want from Ecuador?

Daniel Noboa: I mean, I’m more Ecuador first and he’s more US or America first. But there are ways of working together. We have a compatible economy with the US. It’s our largest trade partner. We’ve been suppliers of not only oil and gold, but fruits, vegetables, and shrimp. Most of our export products go to the US and it’s our largest trade partner. I think there’s compatibility and like I mentioned at the beginning of the interview, we have to be sincere and we have to be reciprocal. It’s not only what you demand, it’s what you ask, what you prefer for your people, and that could be compatible with what another nation prefers for its people. In my case, we found niche products, niche because in Ecuador there’s still a low volume, but that meant something important for the US. We lowered tariffs and total import costs for US cars, especially cars that have larger engines, more than 3,000 cc, and it’s something that we don’t produce, but it’s something that we demand. Americans demand bananas, shrimp, oil products, also lumber, especially light lumber like balsa wood. And there are ways of having trade deals. It’s just people need to take the time to analyze the situation a bit better. It’s good to have the speech with the general idea of what you want for your people, but then there are all these details that need to be seen and that need to be analyzed correctly. I think that there are ways of working with the US. The US has decided to open negotiations about the tariffs with three countries, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Argentina. That was it. And we have some aligned values in some things. We’re not in full agreement, but in most things I think we can find an agreement and we can find something better for our people.

The Economist: Your team’s waving vigorously. Can we do one last question? I’d love to briefly ask about China. Are you interested in Chinese support in the fight against gangs in the form of training, equipment, technology, even some kind of police help?

Daniel Noboa: I think we’re open to all nations. Our third largest trade partners are the US, China, Russia, as nations. Of course, when you put together the European Union, then it’s altogether number three. But as single nations it is the US, China, Russia and then Colombia and Spain. But what we’re looking for is to have true fair trade when it comes to investment, when it comes to mining, when it comes to resources, we need companies wherever they come from, or nations wherever they come from, to respect our laws, to respect our environment, to respect our people. And that is non-negotiable. It doesn’t matter which nation it is. We are a sovereign nation. We’re open to working with everyone. We’ve actually advocated for peace between Ukraine and Russia. We offered ourselves as negotiators because we’re one of the few countries in the world that gets along very well with Ukraine and with Russia. So I think that says a lot of what our policy is. And I think that no nation should cancel opportunities for its people for ideological reasons or to just favor another one. We still have youth unemployment, we still have children that aren’t receiving adequate nutrition, we still need to work on our health system and security. I cannot make a decision based on ideology that will affect Ecuadorian families.

The Economist: Can I make one last, more personal question, Mr President? Because I understand that you got a big tattoo with four phoenixes.

Daniel Noboa: Yes!

The Economist: And your security plan is also called Plan Phoenix. What’s up with all the phoenixes?

Daniel Noboa: The general idea is, I mean, I’ve had health issues in the past. I almost lost my arm in an accident, and the doctor said that I had 80% chance of not being able to move my left arm ever again so after that I prepared myself, I ran for office and I helped my family in a few things, so it was also about how to be able to be reborn in a way. It doesn’t mean that you never lose, it means that you always come back, you come back stronger. So the four phoenixes, it’s the father and the three children. Actually I have my daughter, my youngest son, this is Julio, and Álvarito is over here. So it’s my three children, and when my arm moves, the three smaller ones get closer to the father, that actually has a tattoo with a movement.

The Economist: It’s a good running tattoo.

Daniel Noboa: Yeah exactly, it’s a good running tattoo. Yes, so it also, I understood from the beginning that this wasn’t going to be a quick war, it wasn’t going to be something that it was going to be solved easily, that we’re gonna get hit and attacked, and also kind of not taken into real value, but we were always gonna be reborn again and we’re gonna come stronger and fight and need to be that example. I need to be that example for my people.

The Economist: Do you think you can win this war when cocaine is highly demanded in Europe and the US and illegal? Is that not just a super big structural thing?

Daniel Noboa: I think that we can win this war, because this war isn’t just about cocaine. This war is about terror. This war is about criminality, anarchy. Now we could be talking about cocaine, in five years we’ll be talking about fentanyl, in two years we’ll be talking about illegal gold, probably then about lithium. So it’s about terror, it’s about using resources, stealing resources to affect the population and using that big money also to terrorize the population. So I don’t think that the war is just a war on cocaine, it’s a war against terrorism and criminality and people are trying to affect our way of life.

The Economist: Thank you so much. Thank you very much Mr President.

Daniel Noboa: This month is going to be interesting, on the economic side and we already strengthened our deal, we confirmed our deal with the IMF, and we’re receiving a lot of international finance and aid now, and the goal is to reach a country risk of around 700 and then we can issue debt. Because we’re still about 7 billion dollars away from our debt ceiling. We still have room. We’re one of the nations with the lowest debt in the continent of America. But there’s a constitutional ceiling, debt ceiling, so we need to bring country risk down with security, with strong economy, strong exports, then we can issue bonds and those 6-7 billion dollars can really turn around the country.

The Economist: And the IMF is okay with increased debt issuance?

Daniel Noboa: Yeah, we’re not even at 54%. Even if we issue those 6-7 billion dollars, we wouldn’t even reach 60%.

The Economist: You need a constitutional change to do that?

Daniel Noboa: No, not to issue those 7 billion dollars. I mean, we don’t want to break the ceiling, but we can reach the ceiling. Right now we cannot even reach the ceiling, because we can’t issue bonds with a country risk at 963. We can bring it down to 650, 700. The IMF is happy about it. The IMF has seen that we’ve been overshooting all of our projections. And we’ve done something that’s very rare, is that we do the reforms before they ask us to. And it’s our idea. It’s not theirs. The worst thing that you can present here internationally, because all information is public, is that the IMF asked Ecuador to do this, and they did that, and they compromised the future of our children etc. etc. etc. So, you kind of block that discourse by doing the reforms correctly and doing it on time, before they even ask.

The Economist: And do you think you’ll be able to keep doing that with security spending and all the other pressures that you have right now?

Daniel Noboa: Right now it’s more a cash flow issue than anything else. I guess the economy is stable, sales are increasing dramatically, inflation is at 0.3%, our debt is still at a responsible level. What we need is an injection of cash to move, and that goes into payment to health providers, and it goes to teachers and it goes to construction workers and in projects and infrastructure, so it is that injection of cash that we’re looking to push and issue debt by the beginning of 2026. That’s Rothschild’s estimate, IMF, they just saw our short but strong track record and they said, I think these guys are going to be able to do it by the beginning of 2026. And that’s what we’re looking for. At the end of the day, that’s going to be the only way we can generate employment. Help the youth. This country had very poor planning in terms of their population. We had a record number of births between 2004 and 2011. So all of them are becoming adults now, graduating from high school. So there wasn’t an adequate planning that should have been done around 2015, at least 10 years before, for a number of jobs, and new job creation, spots in public universities, spots in trade schools, technical schools, and that wasn’t planned correctly, and spots were actually lowered, and that’s what exploded in 2021, 2022, 2023 and those young people voted for me in 2023. If you add from 2004, 17 to 18 years, those are the kids graduating, and there’s a gap. When we started there was a gap of close to 400,000 high school graduates without an opportunity to work or study.

The Economist: You must probably have to run. You’re gonna try to change the constitution in some way? Not about the debt, but just in general about other things?

Daniel Noboa: We’re doing constitutional reforms, for example the military bases that have to go through referendum. Right now it passed congress, it has to go through referendum, probably in November, December we’re going to add some other questions.

The Economist: Any priorities in particular for those changes?

Daniel Noboa: Judicial system, priority groups, that in our 2008 constitution, prisoners, or PPL, as it’s called here, the population in our jails have priorities over a normal citizen. Yes. So a pregnant woman, a child, someone that is above 65 years old, those were groups that were prioritized, and the elderly, but they added the PPL [Spanish acronym for people deprived of liberty, i.e., prisoners]. So for example, if you have a 20-year-old healthy woman that is in a car accident because of a drunk driver and goes to an emergency room and you have a serial killer that just got stabbed in the prison in Guayaquil, and they both go to the emergency room, the serial killer has a priority over the 20-year-old woman that has never committed a crime in her life. Exactly. So that’s something that has generated outrage in people because there’s been cases like that. Pancreatic cancer treatment has been prioritized to someone that has committed three homicides before a 25-year-old.

The Economist: And do you need constitutional changes to fight those kinds of injustices?

Daniel Noboa: It’s in the constitution it’s a “grupo prioritario” [priority group].

The Economist: Muchísimas gracias Presidente.

Daniel Noboa: Un gusto.

Reprinted from the Economist, “An interview with Daniel Noboa, Ecuador’s president,” The Economist, 7 June 2025, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2025/06/12/an-interview-with-daniel-noboa-ecuadors-president